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LAWYERS IN THE MORAL MAZE
MARK A. SARGENT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys1 represent an attempt to solve a problem.  The problem is 
that ethical obligations, state law and self-interest apparently do not give 
lawyers sufficient incentives to report law violations by corporate managers "up 
the ladder" to appropriate decisionmakers within the corporate client, or to 
disclose illegality to regulators.  That problem is considered serious, because it 
is believed to have resulted in lawyers' at least passive complicity in managerial 
wrongdoing.  That complicity violated lawyers' fiduciary obligation to their 
corporate client and betrayed their public trust as gatekeepers, thereby 
contributing to the recent epidemic of corporate fraud and corporate governance 
failures.
Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that the problem (as just defined) is 
real and serious.  Let's assume further that the Standards will go some distance 
toward solving that problem (although how much distance is debatable).2  It is 
difficult to predict the potential efficacy of a legal solution to such a problem, 
however, without understanding why the problem exists, how deeply rooted it is 
in the reality of corporate and professional life and how the problem fits 
structurally into its social context.  Only with a fuller understanding of its social 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  Thanks to David Luban 
and [TBA] for their comments on a draft of this paper.  Opinions and mistakes mine, not 
theirs.
1 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 6295 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm (hereinafter referred to as the Standards).
2 The divergence of opinion about the usefulness of the Standards is reflected in the various 
contributions to this symposium.  For other opinions about the Standards, see generally 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics, 1 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming March 2004); Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina M. 
Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, MICH. ST. UNIV. 
D.C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: 
Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public 
Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 873 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As 
Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003); Jill E. Fisch & 
Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. 
REV. 1097 (2003); Thomas Lee Hazen, Administrative Law Controls on Administrative 
Practice – A Look At the Securities and Exchange Commission's Lawyer Conduct Rules, 55 
ADMIN. L. REV. (2003); Marc I. Steinberg, Lawyer Liability After Sarbanes-Oxley – Has the 
Landscape Changed?, 3 WYO. L. REV. 371 (2003). [ADD WASHBURN SYMPOSIUM 
ARTICLES.]
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reality can we assess whether government intervention will succeed or produce 
perverse, distorted or insignificant results.  It is the thesis of this article that the 
problem of lawyer complicity, active or passive, in managerial wrongdoing may 
be rooted in a socially-determined moral obtuseness shared by too many 
corporate managers and corporate lawyers.  Their moral consciousness (or 
unconsciousness) may be so deeply embedded in the social contexts in which 
managers and lawyers operate that the standards may have only a marginal 
effect.  While legal intervention may be needed to counter the gravitational pull 
toward complicity that some lawyers' personal moral resources cannot resist, the 
social dynamics that created the pull are persistent, pervasive and adaptable.  
The Standards may come to be seen as just another set of rules whose 
neutralization, avoidance or manipulation is entirely consistent with the 
prevailing organizational morality.
That possibility may give some basis for pessimism about the success of 
the Standards.  The moral maze in which some corporate lawyers and managers 
find themselves may be just too hard to escape.  Before reaching any 
conclusions, however, let alone pessimistic ones, we need to understand more, 
first, about the varieties of lawyerly complicity in managerial wrongdoing, and 
second, the social and moral universe from which such complicity emerges.
II.THE VARIETIES OF COMPLICITY
The recent scandals have shown that both in-house counsel in major 
corporations and outside attorneys in elite law firms have in fact contributed to 
wrongdoing by corporate managers, in some cases criminally.  It is not possible 
to determine with empirical precision how systemic such behavior is, but there 
has been enough of it in the highest reaches of corporate America and elite law 
firms to suggest that the problem is not a small one.  Lawyers' contributions to 
the series of corporate disasters that cascaded through the first years of this 
decade were significant.  Most disturbing, perhaps, has been the variety of ways 
in which lawyers involved themselves in wrongdoing.
A complete survey of all those varieties is not possible here, but a summary 
of the basic types will provide a sense of the dimensions of the problem:
1. Lawyers affirmatively and intentionally helped managers engage in self-
dealing and misappropriation of corporate assets by deceiving boards about the 
nature of the transactions, particularly failing to advise the board fully about the 
managers' conflict of interest.3
3 The failures of senior in-house counsel at Tyco and Enron in this regard are well known.  
Regarding Tyco, see Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 
20 n.46 (2003).  Regarding Enron, see Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics 
and Enron, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 15 (2003).  Vinson & Elkins, Enron's outside 
counsel, also has been charged with responsibility for this type of failure.  See Sargent, supra, 
at 20-21 (detailing Vinson & Elkins' shortcomings with Enron); Rhode & Paton, supra, at 19 
(same).  There is a question, however, as to whether the outside lawyers, including Vinson & 
Elkins, who advised Enron's board could have done anything to persuade the board that the 
self-dealing transactions they approved were problematic.  That board had a considerable 
amount of information about the conflicts of interest and failed to do anything about them.  
Professors Fisch and Rosen have concluded that "the lawyers could have had little impact on 
corporate policy, absent explicit disclosure of an overt fraud."  Fisch & Rosen, supra note 2, 
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2. In representing corporations before regulatory agencies, lawyers 
deceived the agency about the fraudulent or otherwise illegal nature of 
corporate activities and statements.4
3. Lawyers materially participated in preparing false or misleading 
disclosures in documents filed with the SEC and disseminated to the public, or 
stood by passively.5
4. Law firms provided legal opinions on transactions which the law firm 
had a significant financial interest in promoting.6
5. In-house counsel encouraged managers or employees to destroy 
information related to an investigation, or at least did not discourage them.7
6. Lawyers failed to report "up the ladder" within the corporation when 
at 1119.  While it may be true that the Enron board may have been informed of the conflicts of 
interest, and failed in their own duty of monitoring, it is by no means clear that their failure 
absolves Vinson & Elkins or Enron's in-house counsel of responsibility.  Given their intimate 
knowledge of the full extent of the conflict, the immense profitability of the transactions for 
the insiders, the disproportionate allocation of risk to the corporation, and the lack of arms-
length negotiations, can the advice they gave the board be presumed to have been minimally 
competent?  Furthermore, the apparent approval of the transactions by a prestigious law firm 
may have lulled an already acquiescent board into even greater passivity, especially when 
confronted with very complex transactions.
4 See, for example, the behavior of Kirkland & Ellis in its representation of Spiegel, Inc. 
before the SEC, as described in Stephen J. Crimmins, Independent Examiner's Report 
Concerning Spiegel, Inc. (Sept. 5, 2003) (hereinafter Crimmins Report) (on file with author).  
Kirkland & Ellis filed late notices with the SEC on behalf of Spiegel, stating that the company 
was not filing its periodic reports because it was "'not currently in compliance with its loan 
covenants and is currently working with its bank group to amend and replace its existing 
credit facilities,' and thus 'not in a position to issue financial statements. . .'," even though 
Kirkland & Ellis knew that "the real reason why Spiegel was not filing its periodic reports was 
that it did not want to disclose KPMG's going concern qualification and other material bad 
facts and circumstances threatening Spiegel's survival." Crimmins Report at 83-84.
5 With respect to Vinson & Elkins' active participation with Enron managers in the preparation 
of misleading disclosures, see Sargent, supra note 3, at 20 n.50 (citing William F. Powers, Jr., 
Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of 
Enron Corp. (Feb. 1, 2002) at 178-203 (on file with author)).  Regarding the allegedly active 
complicity of the general counsel of HBO & Co. in fraudulent financial disclosures, see 
Sar gent, supra note 3, at 21, n.50.  For criticism of the passivity of White & Case in the face 
of material non-disclosures by Spiegel managers, see Crimmins Report, supra note 4, at 82.
6 See Paul Braverman, The Bleeding Edge, AM. LAW., June 2003, at 94, 97 (detailing practice 
of providing tax opinions on very aggressive corporate tax shelters when opining law firm was 
actively involved with investment bankers in developing and promoting such transactions).  
Among the firms involved in this practice were McKee Nelson Ernst & Young, King & 
Spalding and Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld.  See id.; Mike France, The Rise of the Wall 
Street Tax Machine, BUS. WK., Mar. 31, 2003, at 84, 85-87.  For more detailed analysis of 
this phenomenon, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 107TH CONG., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL 
TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, (Comm. Print 2003), 
available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/joint/jcs-3-03/vol1/.
7 For critical discussion of the role of Arthur Andersen's in-house counsel and outside 
attorneys (Davis Polk & Wardwell) in the destruction of documents relating to its 
representation of Enron, see Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer 
on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 158-63.
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confronted with material violations of law by managers;8
7. Lawyers failed to conduct adequate special investigations of alleged 
managerial wrongdoing when specifically retained to do so, sometimes because 
of their own conflicts of interest.9
Those are perhaps the principal types of illegal or immoral behavior that 
lawyers have facilitated or participated in, actively or passively, intentionally or 
negligently, enthusiastically or reluctantly.  But why did they do it?  There is no 
shortage of explanations.
III.SOME EXPLANATIONS
The explanations range from the grandiose to the technical.  For example:
Lawyers' wrongdoing simply reflected a general cultural moral decline.
Lawyers got tired of watching their clients make all the money through 
opportunistic behavior in the financial gold rush of the 90's, and decided to join 
in the fun.
Professional values succumbed to business values in large law firms, so 
lawyers became increasingly willing to do anything for money.
The demise of client loyalty and the increasing fragility of client 
relationships required law firms and lawyers to be more "flexible" about 
problematic transactions to preserve the client relationship.
A premium on generating a constant flow of deals and processing them 
rapidly led to inattention to detail, including potential conflicts, over-reliance on 
inexperienced lawyers, and a preoccupation with ensuring repeat business.
The demise of aiding and abetting liability for lawyers,10 the impact of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on class actions,11 and chronic 
SEC understaffing12 contributed to a "Wild West" atmosphere in which the fear 
8 This may have been the primary failure by Enron's general counsel.  For discussion of his 
role, see Miriam Rozen, An Unenviable Position, TEX. LAW. Feb. 4, 2002, at 1.
9 For critical discussion of the serious conflicts of interest that compromised a special 
investigation of Global Crossing conducted by Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, see Report of the 
Special Committee on Accounting Matters to the Board of Directors of Global Crossing Ltd., 
Global Crossing's Response to Olofson's Allegation 37-47 (Feb. 18, 2003) (on file with 
author).  For additional sources discussing the Simpson Thacher investigation, see Sargent, 
supra note 3, at 28 n.77.  For critical discussion of Vinson & Elkins' well-known conflicts of 
interest in its perfunctory investigation of whistleblower allegations regarding massive insider 
self-dealing at Enron, see Cramton, supra note 7, at 162-67.
10 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 
(1994) (denying imposition of aiding and abetting liability).
11 [CITE]
12 For an argument that the SEC has not been equal to its regulatory responsibilities with 
respect to public corporations, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T. AFF., 107TH CONG., 
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of liability was minimized.
The growth and geographic spread of large law firms impeded internal 
monitoring, and led to excessive diffusion of responsibility undermining 
individual accountability, and resulted in proliferating and insufficiently 
monitored conflicts of interest.
Work assigned to outside law firms has become heavily 
compartmentalized, so that lawyers working on particular transactions and 
pieces of transactions may not have the global view or the authority that would 
allow them to detect or deal with wrongdoing.
[find general article discussing or alluding to above?]
All of the foregoing explanations for the involvement of lawyers with their 
clients' wrongdoing —or their failures to restrain that wrongdoing—have some 
force.  A multiplicity of explanations also makes sense because of the 
circumstances and nature of the offenses and lawyers' contributions to them 
varied so much.  Different explanations apply with different force in the various 
contexts; seeking a monocausal explanation would seem to be futile.
IV.THE MORAL ORIGINS OF COMPLICITY
In describing the behavior of the lawyers and law firms in these cases, 
however, there does seem to be something that links them all: an apparent 
indifference to the morality of their actions.  Most of the lawyers involved 
presumably possessed some form of personal moral code, whether based on 
religious or secular premises, and a professional role-morality that should have 
been as stringent in its proper sphere as any personal morality.  Those personal 
and professional moral perspectives, at a minimum, would have insisted upon 
truth-telling, personal integrity, concern about the consequences of one's actions 
for others, recognition of the limitations on one's obligation to a client, and an 
understanding that the "legal" is not coextensive with the "moral."  Those moral 
priorities, however, often seemed to disappear into a smog of expediency, 
rationalization, willful blindness and slavish obedience to the wishes of self-
interested managers who purported to speak for the corporate client.  Of course, 
we cannot read the hearts of those lawyers, our knowledge of the facts is 
incomplete, and hindsight judgment of others can be self-indulgent, but the facts 
speak for themselves: many lawyers in these cases, whether actively or 
passively, helped corporate managers act illegally or immorally or both.
It is sloppy and cheaply judgmental to talk about epidemics of greed or 
stupidity—although there was apparently plenty of both in these cases. It is also 
naive to talk about a fall from a golden age of corporate and lawyerly probity, 
although the opportunities for massive fraud and malfeasance seem to be getting 
greater.  Ultimately, narratives of cultural decline and a decadent zeitgeist are 
historically imprecise and sociologically crude, and of little explanatory use.  
There needs to be a more concrete explanation for why some lawyers' sense of 
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE SECTOR WATCHDOGS 29-68 
(Comm. Print 2002).
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personal and professional moral boundaries seemed to be so insignificant in the 
way they worked with the corporate managers who did so much harm.
Perhaps something more useful can be found by looking at the social 
situations in which these lawyers lived and acted.  What was it about their 
rootedness in specific social contexts that influenced the way they thought about 
what is permissible and what is not, and which seems to have caused them to 
sideline or bracket the sense of limits they brought with them to the workplace 
from their personal, religious or professional moral formations?
A. The Moral World of Corporate Managers
Extraordinary insights into this question can be found in Robert Jackall's 
Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers,13 published in 1988.  This 
book is an in-depth sociological analysis based on extensive fieldwork among 
corporate managers in several corporations in the chemical and textile industries 
in the early 1980s.  Jackall's goal was to examine how bureaucracy shapes 
moral consciousness.14  His premise was that the moral consciousness of 
corporate managers has to be understood not in terms of abstract philosophical, 
religious or professional moral systems, but "sociologically, that is, as 
empirical, objective realities to be investigated."15  That is precisely what 
Jackall attempts to do in Moral Mazes, identifying the actual moral "rules-in-
use"16 that governed the way his corporate managers behaved in their social 
setting.  This highly concrete, empirical approach enabled Jackall to avoid the 
aridity and abstractness of most discussions of business or professional ethics, 
and to explain why managers "bracket, while at work, the moralities that they 
might hold outside the workplace or that they might adhere to privately and to 
follow instead the prevailing morality of their particular organizational 
situation."17  Jackall argues, in essence, that managers tend to adhere to an 
occupational morality determined by the social structure of their 
workplace.[add footnote and find support]  If one wants to understand why 
managers choose to act one way and not the other, including acting immorally 
and illegally, one needs to understand that occupational morality.  To 
understand that occupational morality, however, one must understand the social 
context in which it emerges.  In the large business corporation, he argues, the 
social context is bureaucratic.
Bureaucratic work, Jackall argues, shapes people's consciousness in 
decisive ways.  Much of the way it does so is familiar, particularly in its 
rational/hierarchical characteristics.
It regularizes people's experiences of time and indeed routinizes their lives 
by engaging them on a daily basis in rational, socially approved, purposive 
13 ROBERT M. JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988).
14 See id. at 3 (stating purpose of author's study).
15 Id. at 4.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 6.
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action; it brings them into daily proximity with and subordination to authority, 
creating in the process upward-looking stances that have decisive social and 
psychological consequences; it places a premium on a functionally rational, 
pragmatic habit of mind that seeks specific goals . . . .18
Other ways are perhaps less familiar.  We tend not to think of "impersonal"
bureaucracies as crucibles of intense personal competition, in which people are 
subjected to:
subtle measures of prestige and an elaborate status hierarchy that, in 
addition to fostering an intense competition for status, also makes the rules, 
procedures, social contexts, and protocol of an organization paramount 
psychological and behavioral guides.19
It is in the context of this deeply personal competition for status in a 
hierarchical system of power and domination that people learn to be guided by 
the rules that will promote their success.  A foundational rule is the imperative 
to bracket conventional morality within managerial circles, "where such verities 
are widely recognized to be inapplicable except as public relations stances."20
Once those "verities" are bracketed, the organization's rules-in-use determine 
the decisions that individual managers make.[add endnote and find support]
It is not possible to do justice here to Jackall's thick description of the 
world of his corporate managers, or to the intricacies of its moral system, but 
some of its key characteristics can be summarized.  That world is characterized 
by:
Intense competition for status and power, with people constantly pitted 
against each other.21
A disconnection between hard work and success, based on the reality that 
hard work alone cannot produce success because ability to play the corporate 
"game" is also crucial.22
A disconnection between appearance and reality, derived from the 
realization that the important decisions are made in back rooms; that the public 
reasons for decisions are often not the real reasons;23 and that a willingness to 
18 Id. at 5.
19 Id. at 5-6.
20
 [TBA]
21 As Jackall describes the situation: "since rewards are always scarce, bureaucracies 
necessarily pit people against each other and inevitably thwart the ambitions of some." Id. at 
35.  Jackall sees the competitive dynamic, however, as more than a competition for resources, 
but also as a type of psychological competition: "Even more important on a day-to-day basis 
is the ongoing competition between talented and aggressive people to see whose will prevails, 
who can get things done their way." Id.  The two types of competition, Jackall notes, are 
complementary: ability to impose one's will creates a credibility that facilitates competition 
for resources.
22 
"[M]anagers see success depending principally on meeting social criteria established by the 
authority and political alignments – that is, by the fealty and alliance structure – and by the 
ethos and style of the corporation." Id. at 45.
23 This is so, Jackall argues, even though one of the hallmarks of a bureaucracy is the written 
record:
[E]ven where one can follow a paper trail, most written documents in the corporate world 
constitute simply official versions of reality that often bear little resemblance to the tangled, 
ambiguous, and verbally negotiated transactions that they purportedly represent.  As a result, 
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sustain that disconnection is crucial to personal advancement.
An almost feudal system of personal loyalty and fealty between supervisors 
and inferiors, in which personal fates are interconnected,24 and group loyalties 
are of paramount importance.25
An enormous premium on "flexibility" and willingness to adapt to 
expediency rapidly.26
An optimistic belief that problems of questionable legality or morality can 
be "outrun" before the consequences come to roost and hence, need not be 
confronted.27
A pervasive sense of social uncertainty, in which one is constantly aware of 
being evaluated, but in a system that is capricious and in which all status 
arrangements are contingent and fluid.28
In such a world, a distinctive set of moral rules-in-use emerges; one 
adapted to the social intricacies of the organization. Those rules can be 
characterized as follows:
whatever meaningful tracking does take place occurs within managers' cognitive maps of their 
world, which, of course, are constantly changing and subject to retrospective interpretation 
and reinterpretation.
Id. at 88.  Jackall also found that within his corporate bureaucracies rational decision-making 
processes were not always followed, and that impulsiveness and irrationality were not 
infrequent, but that such behavior was "always justified in rational and reasonable terms.  It is 
so commonplace in the corporate world that many managers expect whatever ordered 
processes they do erect to be subverted or overturned by executive fiat masquerading, of 
course, as an established bureaucratic procedure or considered judgment." Id. at 77.
24 See Jackall, supra note 13, at 17 ("Managers do not see or experience authority in any 
abstract way; instead authority is embodied in their personal relationships with their 
immediate bosses and in their perception of similar links between other managers up and 
down the hierarchy."). Jackall describes the management style he observed as shaping a 
"patrimonial authority arrangement that is crucial to defining both the immediate experiences 
and the long-run career chances of individual managers.  In this world, a subordinate owes 
fealty principally to his immediate boss." See id. at 19.  In describing expensive and 
apparently irrational gestures of fealty to the CEO, Jackall explains that "[i]t is far more 
important to please the king today than to worry about the future economic state of one's fief, 
since, if one does not please the king, there may not be a fief to worry about or indeed vassals 
to do the worrying." Id. at 22.
25 See id. at 25 (discussing sharing of credit for success within hierarchical subgroups in 
corporations).  The importance of group loyalty is underscored by Jackall's comparison of 
managerial circles in sociological terms to gangs. See id. at 39 (discussing social contexts that 
breed alliances).
26 See id. at 128-33 (discussing importance of flexibility and adaptability to expedience in 
order to maintain solidarity with managerial colleagues).
27 For a description of this attitude, as exemplified in the game of "milking the plant" to 
generate short-term profits that make the plant manager look good, and long-term losses that 
are not realized until after the manager leaves (and which can be blamed on his successor), see 
id. at 96-100.
28 Jackall describes how managers have an acute sense of organizational contingency.  
Because of the interlocking ties between people, they know that a shake-up at or near the top 
of a hierarchy can trigger a widespread upheaval, bringing in its wake startling reversals of 
fortune, good and bad, throughout the structure." Id. at 33. Compounding the sense of 
uncertainty created by the "constant potential for social reversal," is an awareness of always 
being on probation, which, Jackall argues "produces a profound anxiety in managers, perhaps 
the key experience of managerial work." See id. at 33, 40.
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The prevailing ethos is remarkable for its lack of fixedness.  Decisions are 
governed by an "essential, pervasive and thoroughgoing pragmatism,"29 in 
which alertness to expediency is of paramount importance.
Questions of "right" or "wrong" should not be confronted as such; an 
insistence on the moral dimensions of an issue is regarded as at best, 
embarrassing, and, at worst, fatally disloyal.30
A willingness to keep silent about problems that may prove embarrassing 
to superiors or the organization is highly prized.31
29 Id. at 105 ("[A] principal managerial virtue and, in fact, managers' most striking actual 
characteristic is an essential, pervasive, and thoroughgoing pragmatism.").
30 See id. at 101-05 for adiscussion of how "White," a specialized manager hired by a textile 
company to deal with the problem of damage to employees' hearing resulting from long-term 
exposure to the company's machinery, failed in his efforts to focus managers' attention to the 
problem, precisely because of his insistence on framing the problem as a moral one.
[T]hough the company publicly pointed with pride to its employment of someone with 
training in audiology, the fact is that White's moral squint on the issue, manifested by his 
obvious moral commitment to the problem and his insistence on the company's obligation to 
workers, made other managers uncomfortable.
Id. at 104. Jackall shows that this discomfort reveals something fundamental about his 
managers' moral consciousness.
[W]hy should his moral stance make other managers uncomfortable?  Managers are, after all, 
men and women with exactly the same kind of moral sensibilities that White possesses 
although they may express them in different arenas of their lives.  Here the political vagaries 
typical of corporations provide the clue to the riddle.  Without clear authoritative sanctions, 
moral viewpoints threaten others within an organization by making claims on them that might 
impede their ability to read the drift of social situations.  As a result, independent morally 
evaluative judgments get subordinated to the social intricacies of the bureaucratic workplace.  
Notions of morality that one might hold and indeed practice outside the workplace—say, 
some variant of Judeo-Christian ethics—become irrelevant, as do less specifically religious 
points of principle, unless they mesh with organizational ideologies.  Under certain 
conditions, such notions may even become dangerous.  For the most part, then, they remain 
unarticulated lest one risk damaging crucial relationships with significant individuals or 
groups.  Managers know that in the organization right and wrong get decided by those with 
enough clout to make their views stick.
Id. at 105.
31 See id. at 31 (regarding secrecy as a pervasive corporate phenomenon).  See id. at 128-33 ( 
describingcase of "Tucker," a "lower middle-level manager" who discovered certain technical 
problems in fibers manufactured by his company that meant almost certain liability disaster).  
The manager dutifully reported up the ladder as quietly as possible:
What follows is a cautionary tale about the virtues of steadfast silence amidst the perils of 
corporate life.  One may gauge the reactions of top executives to Tucker's report from 
subsequent events.  All thirty copies of the report were confiscated.  Tucker was asked to 
surrender all of his working notes.  Tucker's desk was entered and his own copy of his report 
taken.  The carpet was never introduced; the tires were never introduced; the press conference 
was never held.  One executive, three levels above Tucker, was quietly fired; two research and 
development scientists, who apparently had been "fudging data" under pressure from the line, 
were also sanctioned, one fired, the other demoted.  And Tucker never heard about the matter 
again.  He says:
Now clearly the report got to someone because they stopped the introduction of the product.  
This was not a light decision because four years of work and a lot of hope had gone into it.  
There was real panic in the division about it.  But our evidence was irrefutable.  Yet no one 
ever told me thank you; no one ever said that I was a good employee.
3825-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918690 7/15/2004 12:15 PM
110 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:4 p. XXX
Fealty to superiors within the organization trumps other moral 
obligations.32
Individual responsibility for problems or mistakes should be avoided; 
responsibility should be diffused as much as possible; dangerous decisions 
should be avoided.33
Legal and regulatory requirements should be regarded cynically, and 
compliance should be conducted in a manner that serves the interest of the 
individual manager in the competitive game.34
The last remarks are not made in a complaining way.  Rather, Tucker understands that this 
lack of acknowledgment, this silence on the part of authorities, was, first, an implicit warning.
Now the key thing is that if I had pursued this issue I would have been fired, no doubt about it.  
Since I didn't pursue it, I didn't get any credit but I also didn't get fired.  I was the messenger 
that came to the king and told him that his son had been tortured to death and his ears cut off.  
One of the norms here is to keep quiet once you have done your job in reporting what you 
see. . . .If you pursue something like this, no one will like you.  It's that simple.
Tucker has risen steadily since that episode.  He understands now that the silence of his 
superiors also established the criterion for an implicit probation:I think that I've got to where I 
am today because of this. [His boss's boss] knows that I saved the company a lot of money 
and a lot of asses to boot.  And he and others know that I am someone who can be trusted.  I 
can keep my mouth shut. . .And that's the biggest thing that I have going for me—that people 
feel that I can be trusted.  I can't overemphasize that enough.
Id. at 130.
32 See Jackall's discussion of how a manager deeply troubled by blatantly illegal manipulation 
of the pension fund by his supervisors for their own benefit was summarily fired because he 
"could not just go along with things even if he did not agree." Id. at 109.  His termination was 
regarded as entirely appropriate by other managers:
His basic failing was . . . that he violated the fundamental rules of bureaucratic life.  These are 
usually stated briefly as a series of admonitions. (1) You never go around your boss. (2) You 
tell your boss what he wants to hear, even when your boss claims that he wants dissenting 
views. (3) If your boss wants something dropped, you drop it. (4) You are sensitive to your 
boss's wishes so that you anticipate what he wants; you don't force him, in other words, to act 
as boss. (5) Your job is not to report something that your boss does not want reported, but 
rather to cover it up.  You do what your job requires, and you keep your mouth shut.
Id.
33 The tendency toward diffusion of responsibility within corporate bureaucracies is very 
strong because of the intense competition among managers and the enormous contingency and 
fragility of status.  See id. at 85-90 (describing various aspects of corporate scapegoating).  
This leads, however, to the designation of "patsies" to be blamed for failure, regardless of the 
actual level of culpability:
The most feared situation is to end up inadvertently in the wrong place at the wrong time and 
get blamed [for failure or mistake].  Yet this is exactly what happens in a structure that 
systematically diffuses responsibility.  It is because managers fear blame-time that they 
diffuse responsibility; however, such diffusion means that someone, somewhere is going to 
become a scapegoat when things go wrong.
Id. at 86.  The impact of this behavior on managers' sense of accountability was described 
graphically by one of Jackall's managers in the following terms:
The good manager is always aware and always wary.  He knows that he has to be able to point 
the finger at somebody when things go wrong.  There's no accountability in the corporation.  
People don't want to hear about that shit.  What you hope is that no one is after your ass . . . .
Id. at 89.
34 For a summary of managers' attitudes toward regulation and regulators, and of managers' 
need to overcome their challenges, see id. at 147-48.  For analysis of the ideological mind set 
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Truth-telling is essentially optional, because "'truth' is socially defined, not 
absolute, [so] . . . that . . . compromise, about anything and everything, is not 
moral defeat . . . but simply an inevitable fact of organizational life."35
It should be no surprise that Jackall identified several instances in which 
these rules-in-use prevented his corporate managers from coping honestly with 
instances of even blatant illegality, such as financial fraud perpetrated by the 
CEO.36  In that case, loyalties to superiors and other group members, extreme 
sensitivity to short-term expediency, willingness to bury problems with silence 
and, most of all, preoccupation with status in the organization, led not just to 
sidelining of moral concerns but to complicity in substantial wrongdoing.37
Jackall's description of managers' willingness to engage in self-dealing38 and 
manipulation of financial data, and to co-opt in-house lawyers into facilitating 
and hiding the fraud,39 or to exclude them from knowledge of the facts,40 is 
eerily prophetic of the widespread financial fraud at the highest levels of major 
corporations that surfaced so dramatically in recent years.
While Jackall's conclusions about corporate America are, almost by 
definition, limited by his ethnological methodology to a particular set of 
that impedes managers' capacity to deal with regulatory requirements in the chemical and 
textile industries, see id. at 155-61.
35 Id. at 111.
36 See id. at 108 (IDENTIFYING INSTANCES OF RULES-IN-USE PREVENTING HONESTY WITHIN 
CORPORATE REGIME).
37 As Jackall explains, this sort of thing did not bother his managers at all:
[A]s managers see it, playing sleight of hand with the monetary value of inventories, post- or 
predating memoranda or invoices, tucking or squirreling large sums of money away to pull 
them out of one's hat at an opportune moment are all part and parcel of managing in a large 
corporation where interpretations of performance, not necessarily performance itself, decide 
one's fate.  Furthermore, the whole point of the corporation is precisely to put other people's 
money, rather than one's own resources, at risk.
Id. at 110.
38 A manager, Brady, disturbed by clear evidence of manipulation of the pension fund found 
that:
Key people in the corporation . . . were using about $18 million from the employee pension 
fund as a profit slush fund.  Essentially, there was too much money in the pension fund.  
Explicit rules govern such a contingency but these were being ignored.  The money was not 
declared as an asset but concealed and moved in and out of the corporation's earning 
statements each year so that the corporation always came in exactly on target.  In fact, each
October key officials could predict earnings per share for the year to the penny even though 
one-third of all earnings were in foreign currency.  This uncanny accuracy assured top 
executives, of course, of completely reliable bonus payments.  These were tied to hitting profit 
targets and gave top managers in the company up to 100 percent of their annual salary in 
deferred income in stock on top of whatever benefits they had accrued in the pension plan.
Id. at 107.
39 When Brady brought this situation to the attention of the chief lawyer in the firm, he " 'did 
not want to touch the issue with a barge pole.' " Id.
40 See id. at 122-23 (citing examples of two in-house lawyers who were kept in dark about two 
instances of substantial illegal behavior by corporate managers, bribery and improper disposal 
of pesticides).
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companies in two specific (and highly troubled) industries during one time 
period, the scale and breadth of the recent corporate scandals suggests that the 
dynamic he describes, or something like it, was widespread in corporate 
America in the years since Moral Mazes was published in 1988.  The highly 
particularized, socially-conditioned moral world he analyzes so minutely may 
indeed be a large part of our world.
B.  Are Lawyers in the Moral Maze?
But even if Jackall's description of the moral rules-in-use of corporate 
managers is broadly applicable to today's Enrons, WorldComs and 
HealthSouths, what does that have to do with lawyers?  While corporate 
managers may have been caught in a moral maze created by the patterns of 
power and uncertainty in bureaucratic organizations, can it be said that their 
lawyers were caught in a similar maze, causing them to join their clients in 
sidelining the moral considerations they knew to exist and professed to respect?  
A full answer to that question would demand a study of lawyers' lives as 
intensive as Jackall's journey into his managers' lives, but some conclusions can 
be ventured, first about in-house counsel, and then about outside attorneys.
In-house counsel are in precisely the same maze as their managerial 
colleagues.  They are vulnerable to adopting the same occupational morality as 
the managers with whom they work, because they are subject to the same social 
exigencies, power struggles, personal uncertainties and demands of expediency 
that characterize the corporate bureaucratic organization.41  Theoretically, in-
house counsel's role—to protect clients from themselves—and their own sense 
of themselves as independent professionals should make them less vulnerable.  
They should, after all, be expected to function as a check against any tendency 
to view law compliance cynically and truth contingently.42  It can be assumed 
that many in-house counsel do in fact play that role.  In fact, their closeness to 
their managerial clients can produce a trust in their judgment that allows them 
to question and challenge their clients' decisions very effectively.43  That 
closeness, however, is double-edged.  Counsel's constant exposure to the moral 
rules-in-use that govern day-to-day life in the corporation may produce in some 
an ethical numbing that erodes their ability to function in that vital quasi-
adversarial manner.
41 See id. at 108 (describing case of responsibility-dodging chief lawyer) .
42 In an excellent study based on intensive fieldwork in a corporate legal department, Michael 
J. Kelly shows that corporate managers can internalize this role understanding. In MICHAEL J. 
KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 107 (1994), a 
manager describes his relationship with in-house counsel in these terms: "A lawyer should 
seek to restrain you.  It is my lawyer's professional duty to argue with me."  Id.
43 See id. at 85-115 (describing how that trust relationship was developed in company that 
author  studied).  "There is less distrust, because the lawyers and client are literally on the 
same team."  Id. at 90.  Kelly's in-house lawyers "have a connection of trust with the client 
[i.e., the company] that enables the client to accept what he or she may not want to hear, 
without misunderstanding or hard feelings." Id. at 91.
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As a result, corporate counsel may develop tendencies that reflect, rather 
than challenge the organizational morality, including: (i) a tendency to avoid 
characterizing questionable activities as involving "legality" or "illegality," let 
alone "right" or "wrong," so that they may be defined as mere practical 
"problems" to be "managed" as quietly as possible; (ii) a tendency to provide 
ambiguous, tentative advice that enables managers to continue operating on the 
margins of legality;44 (iii) a tendency to acquiesce in silencing whistle-blowers, 
including other lawyers and, most important;45 (iv) a tendency by senior counsel 
to identify too closely with the personal interests and fates of the CEO or other 
senior managers.46  Ironically, lawyers' self-conception as advocates for the 
client, as neutral, non-judgmental facilitators of transactions, or as professionals 
trained to make "arguments" on either side of an issue, can allow a high degree 
of rationalization of their complicity in conduct that is ultimately not in their 
corporate client's interest, certainly not in the public interest and often immoral 
if not illegal.  Lawyers in large corporations, thus, may adapt to the bureaucratic 
organization by developing the same moral consciousness as their managerial 
colleagues, and become trapped in the moral maze out of which they should be 
guiding their clients.  While many avoid that trap, some do not.
Outside attorneys, in contrast, do not occupy the same moral universe as 
the managers of their corporate clients, because they are socialized in different 
organizational settings.  Jackall's analysis of the moral rules-in-use of corporate 
managers thus might not seem terribly relevant to explaining the behavior of 
outside attorneys.  Closer consideration, however, suggests that the analysis is 
in fact quite relevant, at least as a way of defining a threat to lawyers' integrity.
It is relevant, first of all, because of the possibility that lawyers will 
assimilate their clients' world-view.  Donald Langevoort has demonstrated how 
cognitive psychology explains this phenomenon, and, in particular, how it can 
lead to attorney complicity in client fraud.47  Lawyers may develop perceptual 
schema based on first impressions of a client's probity that create a presumption 
of trustworthiness that is hard to overcome.48  Adoption of the client's world-
44 See, e.g., Crampton, supra note 7, at 158-62 (describing advice provided by Arthur 
Andersen's in-house counsel regarding document destruction).
45 See JACKALL, supra note 13, at 108.  In-house lawyers may learn to acquiesce because they 
may be at best ignored or at worst terminated if they attempt to draw attention to illegal or 
otherwise questionable behavior by managers.  See id. (discussing case of corporate cousel 
facing pressure due to discovery of financial fraud).  See also Sargent, supra note 3, at 38 
n.109 (describing fate of would-be whistle-blowing in-house lawyers at Enron).
46 See Sargent, supra note 3, at 38 n.108 (noting similarities with general counsels of both 
Tyco and Enron).
47 See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' 
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 95-110 (1993).
48 See id at 102-03 (noting that cognitive limitations may also prevent lawyers from perceiving 
and acting upon information inconsistent with their presumption of client's probity, because 
such recognition would be threatening to lawyers' self-conception).  Lanngevoort states:
When people voluntarily commit themselves to a certain position, attitude or belief, the 
subsequent discovery of information that indicates harmful consequences flowing from that 
commitment directly threatens their self-concept as good, worthwhile individuals.  Thus, 
cognition processes will work to suppress such information if at all possible.
Id.
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view provides a heuristic that allows an outsider to map and interpret novel and 
uncertain social arrangements.  Assent, or apparent assent to clients' values, 
goals and modus operandi appeals to lawyers' instinct to share in a group 
modality that rewards cooperative behavior.  Langevort thus identifies cognitive 
mechanisms that lead attorneys to the client's world-view; Jackall enriches our 
understanding by telling us something disquieting about what that world-view 
might be, and how it encourages both active and passive involvement in 
managerial illegality and immorality of the type just described.  Once lawyers 
start to think like their clients, they may start to act like their clients.  In this 
view, lawyer complicity is not a simple matter of personal greed or supine 
acquiescence to client greed; it is a defect of cognition and, as such, perhaps 
more dangerous.49
Jackall's analysis is also relevant, however, because large law firms, like 
Jackall's chemical companies, are bureaucratic organizations.  They are social 
structures that may develop moral rules-in-use not dissimilar from those 
operating in those corporations, and that may lead to the kind of bracketing of 
moral restraints characteristic of the corporate moral consciousness.  I cannot, 
of course, state categorically that they are the same, without the type of rich 
information Jackall used in reading his conclusions.  Conclusions derived from 
detailed fieldwork in specific types of organizations should certainly not be 
generalized glibly to other types of organizations.  While large law firms are 
social bureaucracies in Jackall's terms, they are not the same societies as large 
business corporations.  It is also dangerous to generalize about an entire sector 
of the legal profession.
Comparison of the moral consciousness of lawyers to that of managers, 
furthermore, must take into account the different types of moral formation 
provided by lawyers' professional education and training and the sense of public 
trust implicit in their professional self-conception.  Indeed, many lawyers attach 
tremendous value to their self-conception as counselors against fraud and self-
dealing.  It is their raison d'etre or stock-in-trade.  Violation of that self-
conception through even passive complicity in wrongdoing may produce 
intolerable role-strain in such lawyers.  The collegial, participatory manner of 
gov ernance in at least some partnership structures also may be a bulwark 
against the shell games with truth endemic to more hierarchical organizations.  
Lawyers in large law firms thus may be more resistant to the pressure that 
emerges within corporate bureaucracies to develop a stunted moral 
consciousness.
But are they immune?  I believe we need to look closely at whether the 
49 Indeed, as Professor David Luban has pointed out, most of the lawyers involved in some of 
the worst cases of complicity probably do not believe they did anything wrong.
One of the investigators for the Powers Report recalls that when Enron's lawyers were 
explaining the details of the elaborate "special purpose entity" deals that siphoned millions of 
dollars into Andrew Fastow's pockets, they weren't ashamed or embarrassed.  They were 
proud of their handiwork, and eager to explain how they did it.
David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, June 24, 2003, at 2 (copy on file with 
author).
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correlation of status in at least some large law firms with client generation and 
retention, the moral hazards created by an "eat what you kill" method of partner 
compensation,50 the consequent fluidity and instability of personal status, the 
use of internal competition as an organizing principle in what Marc Galanter 
and Thomas Pallay famously called the "tournament of lawyers,"51 the system
of personal patronage, fealty and loyalty among individuals within the firm, and 
the tendency to regard "truth" as socially-defined and contingent common to all 
bureaucracies, tend to produce the kind of moral rules-in-use that can lead to 
complicity in the face of client wrongdoing.  In particular, the need to please 
clients in order to keep them in a highly competitive market for legal services 
suggests that the positive forces supporting lawyer independence too often will 
not be strong enough to counter the drift toward complicity.  The sociological 
theory may need to be worked out, but the record of complicity described above 
suggests that in too many cases the social dynamic of the law firm has produced 
precisely that result not in outlier firms, but at the heart of the elite corporate 
bar.
A WAY OUT OF THE MAZE?
What, then, is likely to be the fate of the Standards?  Do they offer a way 
out of the maze? Are they likely to be an intervention that short circuits the 
patterns of complicity by creating a legal obligation preventing lawyers from 
50 The dependence of partners on unstable client relationships may produce an ethical 
numbing for obvious reasons:
Compensation based on business generation means that partners are more vulnerable to 
shifting market conditions . . . A partner subject to the "eat what you kill" system may be 
anxious about where her next meal is coming from.
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 931, 937 (2002).  As Professor Bainbridge has pointed out in assessing (critically) the 
potential influence of the Standards:
Because an individual partner is even more likely than a firm to be dependent 
on billings to a single major client, the eat what you kill phenomenon makes it 
highly unlikely that such a partner will risk antagonizing key clients absent the 
proverbial smoking gun (and maybe not even then).
Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 18.
51 MARC GALANTER & J. THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 77-120 (1991).  Galanter and Pallay describe the 
promotion-to-partner tournament as a mechanism for recovering the human-specific cost of 
investment in associates by binding them to the firm through offering them the prize of 
partnership for winning the competitive tournament, and preventing them from shirking by 
posing the threat of losing the tournament.  While the adequacy of the economic tournament 
model for explaining the organization of law firms was questioned in David B. Wilkins & G. 
Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information 
Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1586-87 
(1998), even they conceded that it was a useful metaphor, particularly with respect to senior 
associates in their last few years of partnership.  Id. at 1633.  Accord Bainbridge, supra note 2, 
at 12-15.  The winners of such tournaments, furthermore, may be characterized by an "ethical 
plasticity," allowing wide scope for construing self-serving behavior as reasonable, "so that 
moral anxiety is buffered."  Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-
Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
968, 970 (2002).
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doing the kinds of things their socially-determined rules-in-use would incline 
them to do?  Before answering that question, however, it must be emphasized 
that the Standards are actually quite modest as an attempt to solve the problem 
of lawyer complicity in client wrongdoing.  They do not really attempt to 
address the case of lawyers who actively and intentionally participate in and 
benefit from client wrongdoing either as primary violators or aiders and 
abettors.  Lawyers who are willing to do that sort of thing are not likely to 
worry much about violating the up-the-ladder reporting requirement or even a 
noisy withdrawal requirement.  Furthermore, because the Standards, as of this 
writing, do not include a noisy withdrawal/reporting-out requirement, they do 
not address the problem of what lawyers should do when senior managers are 
complicit with or indifferent to the wrongs they have detected.  The Standards 
simply address the problem of passive complicity, of remaining silent when 
confronted with evidence of managerial law violations, when reporting up the 
ladder to senior managers or the board conceivably could have made a 
difference
That problem, however, is important.  One of the core rules-in-use 
described above is the imperative to remain silent in those circumstances.  To 
the extent that the Standards counter that imperative, they will be very useful 
and should be welcomed.  What needs to be considered, however, is whether 
the same social conditions that have resulted in lawyers' silence about some 
serious law violations will also promote rationalization, evasion and willful 
blindness with respect to the Standards' requirements.  That risk is substantial, 
particularly if the criteria that triggers the reporting requirement provides, as 
seems likely, wide discretion for prospective determination by the attorney that 
reporting is not required,52 or retrospective determination by a court that it was 
not required.  Furthermore, if the SEC, as Michael Perino has argued, is neither 
interested in nor capable of enforcing the requirement vigorously,53 the 
prevailing rules-in-use will allow it to slide into irrelevance as legal arguments 
for rationalizing non-reporting, routinized, in-firm bureaucratic mechanisms for 
processing the reporting decision become fixed, and firms learn to avoid the 
kind of situations in which the reporting decision might have to be confronted.54
The mere existence of the rules may have a deterrent effect on many cautious 
and conscientious lawyers, but if the kinds of firms that actively or passively 
contributed to the egregious behavior of corporate clients such as Enron, 
WorldCom and so many others are dominated by a moral consciousness that 
encourages endless rationalization and willful blindness, then the deterrent 
effect is likely to be minimal.55  A full understanding of the social dynamics that 
52 [CITE CRAMTON KONIAK COHEN ARTICLE]
53 [CITE PERINO ARTICLE]
54 In addition, if lawyers were to take the reporting-up requirement seriously, clients may be 
less willing to share information with their lawyers if they feel that their lawyers will blow the 
whistle on them within the corporate hierarchy.  For discussion of this possibility, see Fisch & 
Rosen, supra note 2, at 1128.  The net effect may be removal of lawyers from situations in 
which they conceivably could have a positive influence on corporate decision-making.  See
Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 15-16.
55 For a similarly pessimistic assessment of the potential influence of the Standards, also based 
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generated the need for the Standards in the first place may lead to the 
conclusion that reliance on the ability of those caught in a moral maze to choose 
to recognize and act upon wrongdoing may be overly optimistic.56
The social imperatives militate against development of a consciousness in 
which such self-policing is possible. Defects in cognition, alertness to 
expediency and, most of all, the bracketing of moral concern are all too 
characteristic of the bureaucratic organizations in which lawyers operate and 
which they represent.  Perhaps only a more stringent liability regime under the 
securities laws, including revived aiding and abetting liability and a broader 
scope for primary liability,57 will make a real difference in leading lawyers out 
of the maze.
on assessment of the organizational dynamics of the large law firm, see Bainbridge, supra note 
2, at 17-19. ("[D]espite the attorney's overarching legal obligations to report misconduct, the 
attitudes ingrained by the promotion-to-partner tournament will incline them to intentionally 
or subconsciously overlook evidence of management misconduct").
56 I leave it to others to discuss whether the Standards' reporting-up requirement (or any future 
noisy withdrawal reporting-out requirement) is inconsistent with the lawyer's primary 
obligation to the client.  In other words, to what extent is there a tension between one lawyer's 
responsibilities as gatekeeper and responsibilities as a counselor in business transactions?  For 
an analysis of that tension and criticism of the Standards from practitioners' perspectives, see 
Stanley Keller & Peter Moser, __ VILL. L. REV. __, (2004).  As has been emphasized 
elsewhere, the reporting-up requirement actually supports the lawyer's obligation to the real 
client (the corporation) as distinct from the managers who hired her.  See Cramton, supra note 
__, at 154-56.  While that is true, the federalization of the reporting-up requirement, with the 
at least theoretical risk of SEC enforcement, alters the tone of the lawyer-client relationship 
and may impede the development of trust.  The question, then, is whether the benefits to be 
derived from the Standards outweigh the resulting cost: a tendency to exclude well-
intentioned lawyers from the kinds of deliberations where they could exercise a restraining 
influence.
57 For a useful discussion of how such expanded liability may arise from the litigation against 
the law firms involved in the Enron debacle, see Daniel A. Ninivaggi, Stephen J. Senderowitz 
and James J. Cotter, 91 ILL. B.J. 350 (July 2003).
